Three years after the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the Middle East remains fundamentally different from the regional order that existed on the eve of that day. What began as a highly coordinated assault on southern Israel rapidly developed into a prolonged war in Gaza, a wider confrontation involving Iran and its regional allies, a direct challenge to established assumptions about Israeli deterrence, and one of the most consequential diplomatic and legal crises in the contemporary Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The attacks killed approximately 1,200 people in Israel and resulted in the abduction of 251 people, according to United Nations documentation. The Israeli military response subsequently transformed Gaza into the principal theatre of a conflict whose consequences extended far beyond the territory itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The significance of 7 October therefore cannot be measured only by the events of that day. Its importance lies in what followed: the collapse of Israel’s perception of security along the Gaza frontier; the destruction and displacement experienced by Palestinians in Gaza; the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah; the expansion of confrontation with Iran; attacks by the Houthis on Red Sea shipping; the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a central issue in global diplomacy; and the renewed international focus on Palestinian statehood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Three years later, the central question is no longer simply who won or lost the war. It is whether the post-7 October Middle East can return to the political assumptions that existed before the attack. Increasingly, the answer appears to be no.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the morning of 7 October 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups launched a large-scale assault from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities and military positions surrounding Gaza. The operation combined rocket attacks with breaches of the Gaza barrier and incursions by armed militants into Israeli territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The attack exposed a profound failure in Israel’s intelligence, military preparedness and strategic assumptions. For years, Israeli policy had increasingly treated Hamas as a containable actor whose military capabilities could be managed through deterrence, economic arrangements and periodic military operations. The events of October 7 demonstrated the limits of that approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The attack also challenged a broader regional assumption: that the Palestinian question could gradually be marginalized through bilateral Arab-Israeli normalization while the conflict itself remained unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The United States-sponsored Abraham Accords of 2020 had created diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states and encouraged expectations that further normalization, potentially including Saudi Arabia, could reshape the region around economic integration and strategic cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
October 7 interrupted that trajectory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead of moving toward a Middle East in which the Palestinian issue gradually lost diplomatic centrality, the region entered a period in which Palestine once again became one of the defining questions of Arab and international politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The United Nations’ 2025 New York Declaration subsequently reflected this reality by placing implementation of the two-state solution at the centre of an international diplomatic framework, while explicitly condemning both the attacks against civilians on 7 October and violations against civilians in Gaza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel’s response was built around two principal objectives: restoring Israeli security and dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The resulting military campaign became one of the most destructive conflicts in the modern history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The scale of destruction fundamentally altered the political meaning of Gaza. Before October 7, Gaza was largely viewed internationally through the framework of blockade, humanitarian crisis and recurrent rounds of violence. After October 7, it became the central arena in a regional war involving competing military, political and ideological projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The humanitarian consequences were immense. The United Nations has documented the mass displacement of Palestinians, extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure and severe restrictions on humanitarian access during different stages of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The physical consequences have also created a challenge that extends far beyond the immediate military conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A joint World Bank, United Nations and European Union assessment published in April 2026 examined the physical, social, economic and human impacts of the conflict and provided a technical basis for recovery and reconstruction planning. Earlier World Bank estimates had placed Gaza’s reconstruction and recovery needs at approximately $53 billion, with physical damage alone estimated at around $30 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This means that even if military hostilities end, the political consequences of the war will continue for years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Reconstruction will require not only money, but also governance, security arrangements, control of borders, international guarantees and an agreement over who will govern Gaza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That makes the “day after” one of the most difficult political questions created by October 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Perhaps the most important strategic consequence for Israel has been the transformation of its security doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before October 7, Israel had invested heavily in technological superiority, intelligence capabilities, missile defence, border barriers and deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The attack demonstrated that technological superiority cannot eliminate political and strategic vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel’s subsequent military campaigns have therefore increasingly been shaped by the concept of preventing a repetition of October 7, even at the cost of substantially greater military engagement beyond Gaza.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The consequences were visible in Lebanon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Following the October 7 attack, Hezbollah began attacking northern Israel in what it described as support for Gaza. The confrontation gradually escalated, eventually leading to a much broader Israeli military campaign against Hezbollah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The regional confrontation subsequently extended to Iran itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What had traditionally been a largely indirect confrontation between Israel and Iran increasingly developed into direct exchanges of fire. Iran launched its first direct large-scale attack against Israeli territory in April 2024, while the broader regional confrontation continued to evolve thereafter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From the Israeli perspective, the lesson of October 7 was therefore not simply that Hamas had to be defeated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was that Israel could no longer assume that threats beyond its borders could be managed indefinitely through deterrence alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
October 7 also exposed the interconnected nature of the regional security system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Hamas was not simply a local Palestinian actor. It operated within a wider regional environment involving Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis and various armed groups in Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This network has often been described as Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The war demonstrated both the strength and the limitations of that model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On one hand, the conflict created multiple pressure points against Israel and the United States. Hezbollah opened a northern front, the Houthis attacked shipping and launched missiles toward Israel, and Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria attacked American positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, the escalation ultimately created enormous risks for Iran itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The conflict moved from indirect confrontation toward direct Israeli-Iranian confrontation, fundamentally changing the strategic equation in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By 2026, assessments of Iran’s regional network increasingly emphasized the degradation of Hamas and Hezbollah, while the Houthis remained a significant regional military actor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The strategic paradox is therefore significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
October 7 strengthened the relevance of Iran’s regional network in the short term, but the war that followed also exposed that network to unprecedented military pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The result is a Middle East in which Iran’s influence remains important but is increasingly contested by Israel, the United States and regional governments seeking greater strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lebanon became one of the clearest examples of how October 7 transformed the regional security environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For years, Hezbollah’s military capabilities represented one of the most important constraints on Israeli military freedom of action. Its arsenal and geographic position created a deterrent balance that both Israel and Hezbollah understood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The post-October 7 confrontation changed that balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel used the Gaza war as an opportunity to target Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and leadership. The resulting conflict significantly weakened the organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This does not mean that Hezbollah disappeared as a political or military actor. Rather, its strategic position changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The organization emerged from the confrontation with diminished military capabilities and a more complicated domestic position inside Lebanon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This creates a potential opening for the Lebanese state to strengthen its sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet it also carries risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A weakened Hezbollah could create political competition inside Lebanon, while unresolved tensions between Israel and Lebanon could continue to generate instability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, one of the unintended consequences of October 7 may be the gradual transformation of Lebanon’s internal balance of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Another major consequence of October 7 was the internationalization of the conflict through maritime security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Houthis in Yemen used the Gaza war to justify attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and attacks directed toward Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This transformed the Gaza conflict from a primarily territorial conflict into an issue affecting global trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Red Sea is one of the world’s most important maritime corridors, connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Attacks on commercial shipping increased transportation risks and forced companies to reconsider routes between Asia and Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The strategic lesson was significant:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A conflict involving Gaza could influence international shipping, energy markets, military deployments and global supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Houthis consequently acquired a degree of geopolitical leverage disproportionate to Yemen’s economic and military weight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gaza war thus demonstrated that non-state actors can use regional conflicts to exert pressure far beyond their immediate geography.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One of the most important political consequences of October 7 has been the revival of the Palestinian issue in Arab public opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before the attack, several Arab governments were increasingly focused on economic modernization, investment, technology and strategic partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Abraham Accords had created a framework for normalization between Israel and several Arab states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
October 7 dramatically complicated this process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Research by Arab Barometer found that support for normalization with Israel declined across surveyed Arab societies following the Gaza war. In Morocco, for example, support declined from 31 percent in 2022 to 13 percent after October 7. The research also found continued broad support for Palestinian statehood and, in many countries, support for a two-state solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This creates a major contradiction for regional governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the one hand, Arab states have strategic interests in maintaining relations with Israel and the United States and in developing regional economic and security partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, public opinion makes it considerably more difficult to advance normalization while the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The result is likely to be a new form of Arab diplomacy: normalization may remain strategically attractive, but it increasingly requires a credible political pathway toward Palestinian statehood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Saudi Arabia occupies a particularly important position in this equation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before October 7, discussions about possible Saudi-Israeli normalization had created expectations of a major geopolitical realignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The attack and subsequent war made such an agreement politically far more complicated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fundamental issue is no longer simply whether Saudi Arabia is willing to establish relations with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The larger question is what political price Riyadh would require from Israel and the United States in return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments, Palestinian statehood has become increasingly difficult to treat as a secondary issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The future of normalization may therefore depend less on bilateral Israeli-Arab relations and more on whether Israel, the United States and Arab states can establish a credible framework connecting normalization with Palestinian political rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is one of the most important strategic legacies of October 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
October 7 also transformed the conflict into an unprecedented legal and diplomatic confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The International Court of Justice issued provisional measures in the case brought by South Africa against Israel under the Genocide Convention. The Court ordered Israel to take measures within its power to prevent acts falling within the scope of the Convention and subsequently reaffirmed and supplemented its provisional measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The International Criminal Court also issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Court separately issued a warrant for Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif, alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity committed from 7 October 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These proceedings do not represent a final judicial determination of all allegations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, their political significance is substantial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has increasingly become a question not only of military power and diplomacy but also of international accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This development could influence future military decision-making, diplomatic relations, arms transfers and the international legitimacy of the parties involved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The war has simultaneously weakened Palestinian armed organizations and strengthened the international argument for Palestinian statehood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This apparent contradiction is central to understanding the post-October 7 environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Hamas’s military capabilities have been severely degraded, yet the political grievances that contributed to the conflict have not disappeared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Indeed, the destruction in Gaza, displacement, humanitarian crisis and political uncertainty have created a new generation of grievances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The central question is therefore whether military pressure can produce political stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
History suggests that military victories can alter the balance of power, but they rarely resolve conflicts when the underlying political dispute remains unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is why the international community increasingly returned to the two-state framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2025 New York Declaration explicitly linked the end of the Gaza war, Palestinian self-determination, Israeli security and regional integration. The declaration was subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly by 142 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The political challenge is implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For decades, the two-state solution has existed primarily as a diplomatic formula.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The post-October 7 environment requires turning that formula into an actual political and security architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most difficult question emerging from the war is who governs Gaza after the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Four broad models have been discussed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First, continued Israeli military control.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This could provide Israel with direct security control but would impose enormous political, economic and military costs and would not necessarily eliminate the possibility of insurgency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, continued Hamas rule.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This would preserve an existing local governing structure but would be unacceptable to Israel and many international actors and would make long-term reconstruction and normalization extremely difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third, Palestinian Authority-led governance.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This would reconnect Gaza politically with the West Bank and could provide an internationally recognized Palestinian framework. However, the Palestinian Authority faces serious legitimacy, institutional and security challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth, an internationally supported transitional administration.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This could involve Arab states, international organizations and Palestinian institutions working together during a transitional period before the gradual establishment of unified Palestinian governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fourth model may offer the greatest diplomatic flexibility, but it would require unprecedented coordination among Israel, the Palestinians, Arab states, the United States and international institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reconstruction will become one of the central geopolitical issues of the coming decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The World Bank, United Nations and European Union have already established a technical basis for assessing Gaza’s damage and recovery requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But reconstruction cannot be separated from politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who controls the money?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who guarantees security?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who controls borders?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who prevents the reconstruction of military infrastructure?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who governs Gaza?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who represents Palestinians?<\/p>\n\n\n\n And what political status will Gaza have within the broader Palestinian question?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Without answers to these questions, reconstruction risks becoming temporary humanitarian management rather than genuine recovery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A sustainable reconstruction process would therefore require a political settlement alongside financial support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Three years after October 7, at least seven structural changes can be identified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. Israeli security doctrine has changed.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Israel is less willing to rely on containment and deterrence alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Hamas has been severely weakened militarily.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n However, its ideological and political legacy remains part of the Palestinian landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. Hezbollah’s regional position has been significantly weakened.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The organization remains influential but faces a substantially altered strategic environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4. Iran’s confrontation with Israel has become more direct.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The old model of indirect competition through regional partners has been increasingly replaced by direct strategic confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5. The Palestinian issue has returned to the centre of Arab diplomacy.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The assumption that economic normalization could proceed while the Palestinian question remained unresolved has become considerably harder to sustain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6. International law has become a central battlefield.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The ICJ and ICC proceedings have changed the diplomatic environment surrounding the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 7. The two-state solution has regained international momentum, but implementation remains uncertain.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The gap between diplomatic declarations and political reality remains enormous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most important paradox of October 7 is that the attack was intended to transform the regional balance, but the war that followed transformed it in ways that were not necessarily anticipated by its authors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hamas succeeded in demonstrating that the existing security architecture could be breached.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Israel’s military response subsequently weakened Hamas and Hezbollah, intensified pressure on Iran, and altered the regional military balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, however, Israel’s military campaign generated enormous humanitarian and diplomatic costs, weakened international support in parts of the world, increased pressure for Palestinian statehood and created legal challenges unprecedented in the history of the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The result is not a simple victory for one side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is a transformed strategic environment in which almost every actor faces new constraints.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A ceasefire framework gradually develops into a more durable political arrangement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Gaza reconstruction begins, Palestinian governance is strengthened, Arab states participate in reconstruction, and international actors provide security guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the most positive scenario but also the most difficult to implement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Large-scale war does not return, but Gaza remains divided, militarily controlled and politically unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Israel maintains significant security control while Hamas or other armed factions retain influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This could produce recurring violence and prevent meaningful reconstruction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A new crisis involving Iran, Israel, Hezbollah or the Houthis could once again connect Gaza to a broader regional confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The experience since 2023 demonstrates that a local conflict can rapidly become a regional security crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most ambitious scenario would connect Palestinian statehood, Israeli-Arab normalization, regional security arrangements, reconstruction and economic integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such an architecture would transform the legacy of October 7 from a cycle of war into the starting point for a new political settlement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether regional powers possess the political will to achieve this remains the central question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Three years after October 7, the Middle East has not returned to the strategic environment that existed on 6 October 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The attack destroyed the assumption that the Palestinian conflict could be indefinitely contained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subsequent war demonstrated that Israel’s military power, although overwhelming, cannot by itself resolve the political question of Palestine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran’s regional network demonstrated its ability to internationalize a conflict, but it also suffered significant strategic setbacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arab governments discovered that public opinion continues to constrain their foreign-policy choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States found itself once again deeply involved in the Middle East despite repeated attempts to reduce its regional military footprint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Europe faced difficult questions concerning international law, humanitarian policy and relations with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And the international system was forced to confront a fundamental question: can the existing diplomatic framework still produce a sustainable peace?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The answer will depend on what happens after the guns fall silent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the region returns to the previous model of temporary ceasefires, military deterrence, unresolved occupation, political fragmentation and periodic escalation, October 7 will become merely another chapter in a long history of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But if the international community uses the consequences of the past three years to establish a credible political process \u2014 one that addresses Israeli security, Palestinian statehood, Gaza reconstruction, regional security and international guarantees simultaneously \u2014 then October 7 could ultimately become the event that forced the Middle East to abandon an unsustainable status quo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fundamental lesson of the third anniversary is therefore clear:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Middle East cannot be rebuilt through military power alone.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Security without a political settlement will remain fragile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reconstruction without governance will remain temporary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Normalization without resolving the Palestinian question will remain vulnerable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And diplomacy without implementation will continue to lose credibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The real post-October 7 challenge is not simply to end a war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is to construct a regional order in which the conditions that produced the cycle of violence are addressed rather than postponed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That is the strategic test facing the Middle East as it enters the fourth year of the October 7 era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Executive Summary Three years after the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the Middle East remains fundamentally different from the regional order that existed on the eve of that day. What began as a highly coordinated assault on southern Israel rapidly developed into a prolonged war in Gaza, a wider confrontation involving Iran…<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":29029,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[22,25],"tags":[],"post_template":[87],"top_category":[],"class_list":["post-29033","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-middle-east","category-politics","post_template-post","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29033","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29033"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29033\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29034,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29033\/revisions\/29034"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29033"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29033"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29033"},{"taxonomy":"post_template","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_template?post=29033"},{"taxonomy":"top_category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/top_category?post=29033"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n\n\n\nXII. Gaza Reconstruction: The Next Geopolitical Test<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nXIII. Three Years Later: What Has Actually Changed?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nXIV. The Central Strategic Paradox<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nXV. Possible Scenarios for the Next Phase<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Scenario One: Fragile Stabilization<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Scenario Two: Frozen Conflict<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Scenario Three: Renewed Regional Escalation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Scenario Four: A New Regional Political Architecture<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\nXVI. Conclusion: October 7 and the End of the Old Middle East<\/h2>\n\n\n\n