Chemical weapons are among the most dangerous means of warfare because of their toxic effects on people and the environment, and because their impact can be difficult to confine to combatants alone. The international community has imposed a comprehensive ban on their use and established an organization to monitor implementation. Yet armed conflicts continue to expose serious challenges to civilian protection and the enforcement of international rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fighting broke out in Sudan in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces. The conflict spread from Khartoum to other areas and was accompanied by a widespread humanitarian crisis and serious abuses. In the context of the war, a joint investigation by France 24 and C4ADS reported strong evidence that chlorine had been used as a weapon near the Al-Jaili refinery in September 2024, during army operations to retake the site. In April 2025, the United States also announced that it had determined that the Sudanese government had used chemical weapons during 2024 and imposed punitive measures on that basis (Kimball, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This study proceeds from the position that the Sudanese Armed Forces used chlorine as a weapon in military operations near the Al-Jaili refinery, placing the conduct of the armed forces and their leadership\u2014foremost among them al-Burhan\u2014under political and legal scrutiny. It examines the context of the use, the legal basis for the prohibition, its consequences, and the requirements of international accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The research problem is the Sudanese Armed Forces\u2019 use of chlorine as a weapon during the conflict and the resulting breach of Sudan\u2019s international obligations. The study also addresses the gap between the gravity of the use and the international response, as well as the risk that inadequate accountability will enable further violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The study addresses the following questions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The study aims to analyze the Sudanese military\u2019s use of chlorine as a weapon, explain how this breached the Chemical Weapons Convention, and examine the consequences for civilians and for the standing of Sudan\u2019s military institution. It also seeks to highlight the army leadership\u2019s responsibility for the conduct of the institution and the need to investigate the chain of command and hold those responsible to account.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The study is significant because it concerns civilian protection and the credibility of the international ban on chemical weapons. It also highlights the challenge of translating international obligations into practical accountability when a national military uses a toxic substance in combat operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The study uses a descriptive and analytical approach. It outlines the context of the war, examines the relevant legal provisions, and analyzes reports and international positions concerning the use of chlorine. Its scope is limited to the reported incident near the Al-Jaili refinery in September 2024 and the diplomatic and legal response that followed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The war in Sudan broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces after tensions escalated over political arrangements and security-sector reform. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the armed forces during the conflict, as fighting spread across multiple areas and inflicted extensive damage on civilians and infrastructure. Amnesty International reported that parties to the conflict had used a range of weapons and that some of the violations committed could amount to war crimes (Amnesty International, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Al-Jaili refinery, north of Khartoum, emerged as a strategically important site during military operations. Arms Control Today<\/em> reported that the France 24\u2013C4ADS investigation found strong evidence of chlorine being used as a weapon near the refinery on September 5 and 13, 2024. According to the account, the Sudanese military dropped barrels containing chlorine as it sought to retake the site from the Rapid Support Forces. The analysis also noted that the army was the Sudanese party with the air capability required to carry out attacks of this kind (Kimball, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n These reports place the use of chlorine within the context of a military operation conducted by the armed forces led by al-Burhan. The consequences were not confined to the combatants: using a toxic substance near civilian areas and an industrial facility exposed civilians, workers, and surrounding areas to additional risks. Turning a substance with civilian uses into a weapon of war also represents a serious escalation in the means employed in the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sudan acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction\u2014the Chemical Weapons Convention\u2014on May 24, 1999. The Convention entered into force for Sudan on June 23 of that year (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], 1999).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Article I prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring chemical weapons. It also prohibits their use and preparations for their use, as well as assistance or encouragement to any party engaging in prohibited activities. The Article further prohibits the use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare (OPCW, n.d.-a).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under these obligations, the Sudanese Armed Forces\u2019 use of chlorine as a weapon in military operations constitutes a breach of the Convention. The fact that the conflict is internal does not release the state from its treaty obligations, nor does the identity of the targeted party\u2014as an armed group\u2014change the prohibition. The army\u2019s leadership, including al-Burhan as commander of the armed forces, bears political and institutional responsibility for ensuring that forces under its command comply with international rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Article II of the Convention defines chemical weapons to include toxic chemicals and their precursors, as well as munitions and devices designed to cause death or harm through the toxic properties of those chemicals. It defines a toxic chemical as any substance that, through its chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals (OPCW, n.d.-b).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chlorine has civilian uses, including water treatment, but those uses do not justify its use in combat. The relevant considerations are the nature and purpose of its use. When the substance is contained and deployed in a military operation with the aim of causing harm through its toxic properties, it is transformed from a substance with civilian applications into a prohibited weapon of war. Reports that barrels containing chlorine were dropped near the Al-Jaili refinery during a military operation support the characterization of the incident as the use of chlorine as a weapon (Kimball, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In July 2025, a Canadian statement to the Executive Council of the OPCW referred to reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces had used chemical weapons. It said the reports had been sufficient to prompt U.S. sanctions against Sudan and that four States Parties had sought clarification under Article IX of the Convention. The statement also called on the Technical Secretariat to continue monitoring the situation and supporting compliance with the Convention (Government of Canada, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Article IX allows States Parties to consult and seek clarification on matters that raise concerns about compliance. It also enables the Executive Council to assist in clarifying the facts, including by drawing on experts and examining relevant information (OPCW, n.d.-c). These diplomatic steps are important, but they should lead to an investigation that establishes what substance was used, how it was delivered, which party was responsible for the operation, and how orders were issued through the chain of command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Sudanese army\u2019s leadership bears political and criminal responsibility for the conduct of the military institution and for its response to allegations against it. This includes a duty to cooperate with investigations, preserve evidence, and prevent a recurrence. Determining al-Burhan\u2019s or any other individual\u2019s criminal responsibility for issuing a specific order requires evidence concerning orders, the chain of command, and actual participation. This distinction does not negate political or institutional responsibility; it clarifies the type of responsibility an investigation must examine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Exposure to chlorine can cause serious respiratory harm and injuries that may prove fatal, depending on the level and conditions of exposure. The risks are not limited to combatants; civilians, facility workers, and people in nearby areas may also be affected. Use of the substance near an industrial facility further complicates the assessment of the incident\u2019s effects and the medical and humanitarian response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Politically, the use of chemical weapons places the Sudanese military and its leadership in direct conflict with the country\u2019s international obligations. It also damages the credibility of the military institution and strengthens calls for closer international scrutiny and more robust accountability. A failure to hold those responsible to account risks normalizing the use of prohibited weapons and undermining the international ban intended to prevent toxic substances from being used in war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The study concludes that the Sudanese Armed Forces used chlorine as a weapon near the Al-Jaili refinery in September 2024, according to a journalistic investigation that described its evidence as strong, followed by a U.S. assessment and diplomatic action within the OPCW. This use constitutes a serious violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Sudan is a party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The army\u2019s leadership, including al-Burhan as the commander of the army, bears political and criminal responsibility for the military\u2019s conduct. Individual accountability\u2014including that of senior leaders\u2014depends on establishing what each person did, ordered, or knew, and on the evidence uncovered by an investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The study recommends enabling the OPCW and relevant technical bodies to examine the facts and available evidence; preserving relevant testimony and material evidence; investigating the chain of command and military orders; publishing the findings; and holding those responsible to account. It also calls for measures to prevent the further use of chemical substances as weapons and to protect civilians in conflict zones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Amnesty International. (2024, July 25). New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict: Expanding existing arms embargo across Sudan to protect civilians<\/em>. https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/latest\/research\/2024\/07\/new-weapons-fuelling-the-sudan-conflict\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n Government of Canada. (2025, July). Statement of Canada to the 109th session of the OPCW Executive Council: Agenda item 5\u2014General debate<\/em>. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. https:\/\/www.opcw.org\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2025\/07\/Canada_EC-109_National%20Statement_ol_%28e%29.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kimball, D. G. (2026, January\/February). Sudan army said to use chlorine as weapon. Arms Control Today<\/em>. https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/act\/2026-01\/news\/sudan-army-said-use-chlorine-weapon<\/p>\n\n\n\n Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (1999, May 26). The Republic of the Sudan accedes to the Chemical Weapons Convention<\/em>. https:\/\/www.opcw.org\/media-centre\/news\/1999\/05\/republic-sudan-accedes-chemical-weapons-convention<\/p>\n\n\n\n Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (n.d.-a). Article I: General obligations<\/em>. https:\/\/www.opcw.org\/chemical-weapons-convention\/articles\/article-i<\/p>\n\n\n\n Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (n.d.-b). Article II: Definitions and criteria<\/em>. https:\/\/www.opcw.org\/chemical-weapons-convention\/articles\/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria<\/p>\n\n\n\n Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. (n.d.-c). Article IX: Consultations, cooperation and fact-finding<\/em>. https:\/\/www.opcw.org\/chemical-weapons-convention\/articles\/article-ix-consultations-cooperation-and-fact-finding<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Introduction Chemical weapons are among the most dangerous means of warfare because of their toxic effects on people and the environment, and because their impact can be difficult to confine to combatants alone. The international community has imposed a comprehensive ban on their use and established an organization to monitor implementation. Yet armed conflicts continue…<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":29214,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"pmpro_default_level":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[23,98],"tags":[],"post_template":[],"top_category":[77],"class_list":["post-29199","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-africa","category-politics-africa","top_category-featured-content","pmpro-has-access"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29199","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29199"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29199\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29213,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29199\/revisions\/29213"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29214"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29199"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29199"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29199"},{"taxonomy":"post_template","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_template?post=29199"},{"taxonomy":"top_category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/top_category?post=29199"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}II. The International Legal Framework<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Chemical Weapons Convention and Sudan\u2019s Obligations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Defining Chemical Weapons and Applying the Definition to Chlorine<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
III. International Response and Accountability<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
IV. Humanitarian and Political Consequences<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion and Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n