{"id":29419,"date":"2026-11-03T10:35:27","date_gmt":"2026-11-03T10:35:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/?p=29419"},"modified":"2026-11-03T10:35:29","modified_gmt":"2026-11-03T10:35:29","slug":"a-government-that-negotiates-a-leadership-that-decides-who-holds-power-over-war-and-peace-in-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/veracitypapers.com\/fr\/a-government-that-negotiates-a-leadership-that-decides-who-holds-power-over-war-and-peace-in-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"A Government That Negotiates, a Leadership That Decides: Who Holds Power Over War and Peace in Iran?"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Introduction<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

When an Iranian president or foreign minister speaks about negotiations, the scene can appear familiar: a government sets its priorities, diplomats conduct talks, and an agreement moves towards approval. Yet this outward picture reveals only part of how power operates in the Islamic Republic. The government manages much of the state\u2019s day-to-day business, but it does not independently determine its strategic direction, particularly on matters of war, peace and national security. Nor, however, is it merely a public-facing instrument for decisions made elsewhere. Its role in developing options, drafting proposals and conducting negotiations can be substantial. Understanding Iranian decision-making therefore requires a distinction between the authority to make the final decision and the capacity to shape the choices from which that decision is made.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This distinction lies at the heart of a persistent question: how much influence can an Iranian government exercise over negotiations when it does not possess the ultimate authority to determine their strategic outcome? The answer emerges from the relationship between the Supreme Leader, the presidency and the Supreme National Security Council\u2014and from the nuclear negotiations of 2013\u20132015, which demonstrated how an expanded diplomatic role for the government could coexist with an unchanged hierarchy of power. Those negotiations offer a useful case study precisely because they distinguish the work of producing an agreement from the authority to approve its implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Power Is Distributed, but Not Equally<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s constitution establishes a clear imbalance between the powers of the Supreme Leader and those of the elected government on strategic matters. Article 110 assigns the Leader responsibility for determining the country\u2019s general policies after consultation with the Expediency Council, supervising their implementation, commanding the armed forces, and declaring war, peace and mobilisation. It also grants the Leader authority to appoint senior military commanders, including the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Article 113, meanwhile, identifies the president as the country\u2019s highest official after the Leader and places the executive branch under presidential authority, except in matters directly assigned to the Leadership. The president is therefore an important centre of executive power, but not an autonomous commander of Iran\u2019s military or the final arbiter of its strategic choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This hierarchy does not mean that policy emerges fully formed from a single office. Final approval and policy formulation are different functions. Someone must assess costs, develop alternatives, negotiate language and determine whether a proposed arrangement can work in practice. The nuclear negotiations under President Hassan Rouhani illustrate this distinction. The Foreign Ministry took the lead in conducting the talks, while the Supreme National Security Council retained a coordinating role and the Supreme Leader remained the ultimate authority over the nuclear diplomacy. The government\u2019s influence lay partly in shaping the substance of the options presented for approval, rather than in possessing an unrestricted right to choose among them.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two opposing interpretations consequently miss an important part of the picture. One treats every conciliatory statement by an Iranian foreign minister as evidence that the state has already changed its strategic course. The other dismisses diplomacy as inconsequential because the minister lacks the final say. A more useful interpretation recognises the space between those positions. Negotiators can influence the terms on which a compromise becomes possible without acquiring the authority to redefine the state\u2019s overarching objectives. Moving responsibility for the nuclear talks to the Foreign Ministry in 2013 changed the machinery of negotiation; it did not, by itself, change the constitutional location of ultimate power.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Council Between Diplomacy and Security<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Supreme National Security Council provides an institutional link between the government\u2019s diplomatic responsibilities and the state\u2019s wider security apparatus. Under Article 176, the council is chaired by the president and is responsible for determining defence and national security policies within the general policies established by the Leader. Its duties also include coordinating political, intelligence, social, cultural and economic activities relevant to defence and security, and mobilising national resources to address internal and external threats. Crucially, its decisions become effective only after the Leader\u2019s confirmation. Presidential chairmanship therefore gives the government an important position within the process, but not independence from the constitutional hierarchy above it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This arrangement helps explain why the Foreign Ministry alone cannot provide a complete picture of Iranian policy on a sensitive issue. A negotiation ostensibly concerned with sanctions relief may also involve nuclear facilities, verification arrangements, defence assessments and commitments affecting national security. One diplomatic delegation abroad can therefore represent a position assembled through several institutions at home. The council\u2019s constitutional role is to coordinate these intersecting concerns within the framework established by the Leadership, rather than to replace either the government\u2019s diplomatic machinery or the Leader\u2019s authority.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The same institutional structure also calls for caution when interpreting differences in public statements. Divergent language does not, on its own, establish that the state is divided into competing centres pursuing entirely separate policies. Yet it would be equally misleading to assume that every difference is a carefully coordinated performance. Constitutional provisions identify formal responsibilities; they do not disclose the content of every internal debate or the influence each participant exercises in a particular meeting. A rigorous assessment must therefore distinguish what the institutional framework establishes from what requires separate evidence about a specific decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Nuclear Agreement: A Test of Government Influence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The nuclear negotiations under Rouhani offer a particularly revealing example of how these relationships operate. Following his election in 2013, responsibility for leading the talks moved to the Foreign Ministry, with Mohammad Javad Zarif heading the negotiating team. According to the US Congressional Research Service, the Supreme National Security Council continued to coordinate the negotiations, while the Supreme Leader retained final authority over diplomacy concerning the nuclear agreement. This was a significant change in how the file was managed, but not a transfer of the Leader\u2019s constitutional powers to the presidency.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s contribution lay in translating political permission to negotiate into an arrangement that could actually be negotiated. Authorisation to pursue talks does not automatically produce agreement on reciprocal obligations, sequencing or verification. The process yielded an interim accord on 24 November 2013 and the comprehensive nuclear agreement on 14 July 2015. These outcomes demonstrate why the negotiating team\u2019s role cannot reasonably be described as ceremonial. It performed the diplomatic work necessary to turn a broad political opening into specific commitments, even while operating within limits set by a higher authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The subsequent approval process exposed the boundaries of that influence. On 21 October 2015, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave conditional approval for the agreement\u2019s implementation in a letter to Rouhani, following parliament\u2019s passage of legislation relating to its implementation. Reaching an agreement abroad had not removed the need to secure authorisation at home. Nor did the negotiating team control all the conditions under which implementation would proceed. To credit the government alone would overlook the authority required to approve the outcome; to credit the Leadership alone would obscure the diplomatic work that made that outcome possible.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The broader lesson is that a government can receive a wider diplomatic mandate without acquiring strategic autonomy. Its ministers may gain room to explore proposals, develop language and manage engagement, while the Leadership retains authority over the boundaries of acceptable compromise. Government influence should therefore be assessed not simply by the frequency of diplomatic meetings or the prominence of official statements, but by the ability to turn proposals into commitments that receive approval and can be implemented. The nuclear case makes clear that shaping a decision and holding the final say over it are related, but distinct, forms of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

War and Negotiation: Different Instruments, the Same Hierarchy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The constitutional boundary is more explicit in matters of war. Authority to declare war and peace, command the armed forces and appoint key military leaders belongs to the Supreme Leader, not to the president or cabinet. Control of the diplomatic apparatus should therefore not be mistaken for equivalent control over the military establishment. Iran\u2019s presidency cannot be understood through the assumptions applied to political systems in which an elected president is also commander-in-chief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, the separation of formal powers does not eliminate the relationship between military, economic and diplomatic choices. Decisions concerning conflict have consequences that the government must help manage, while Article 176 explicitly places the coordination of relevant political, economic and security activities within the Supreme National Security Council\u2019s remit. The government can thus contribute to assessing costs and developing diplomatic alternatives without possessing an independent mandate to decide on war or peace. Its role is neither comprehensive control nor complete exclusion, but participation within an unequal distribution of authority.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Revolutionary Guards must also be understood within this distinction. Article 110 places the appointment of the organisation\u2019s commander under the Leader\u2019s authority, alongside supreme command of the armed forces. The Guards\u2019 institutional strength does not make them a constitutional substitute for the Leadership, just as their relationship with the Leader does not place them within the government\u2019s ordinary executive chain of command. Claims about their actual influence over a particular negotiation or military decision require evidence specific to that case; they cannot be established from the constitutional framework alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Diplomatic negotiations must also be distinguished from a strategic decision to make peace. Not every round of talks constitutes an agreement to end a conflict, and not every technical arrangement amounts to a change in security policy. A government may conduct consequential negotiations while remaining unable to alter, on its own, the strategic direction within which those negotiations take place. The 2013\u20132015 nuclear process illustrates the relationship: direct government leadership of the talks, institutional coordination through the national security system, and ultimate approval by the Leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion: Influence Is Not Independence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Iranian decision-making cannot be explained through a single institution, but neither can its institutions be treated as equal participants in the exercise of power. The Leadership holds the highest constitutional authority over general policy, the armed forces, war and peace. The Supreme National Security Council coordinates security-related policy within that framework, while the government manages diplomacy, executive responsibilities and an important share of policy preparation. The nuclear negotiations demonstrate that these roles can combine to produce an agreement without dissolving the distinction between those who negotiate its terms and those who authorise its implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The central finding is that delegation<\/strong> does not amount to a transfer of ultimate authority. A president or foreign minister may become indispensable to the achievement of an agreement without becoming independent of the system that approves it. The most revealing question is therefore not merely who can deliver the final word in Iran. It is also who develops the options on which that word will be pronounced, who coordinates their approval, and who can translate an authorised decision into workable policy. Viewed together, these stages reveal a government that is influential but constrained, and a Leadership whose power to decide should not be confused with sole authorship of every policy it endorses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources<\/h2>\n\n\n\n