Abstract
The international system is experiencing a crisis of cooperation at a time when collective action has never been more necessary. Armed conflicts, economic fragmentation, climate change, public-health threats, mounting debt and technological competition increasingly transcend national borders, yet the institutions established to manage these challenges are struggling to produce timely, effective and widely accepted responses. The United Nations faces persistent divisions among major powers, the World Trade Organization continues to grapple with weaknesses in its dispute-settlement system, and climate negotiations remain constrained by disagreements over responsibility, financing and implementation.
This crisis does not necessarily signify the end of multilateralism. Rather, it reflects a widening gap between the realities of a changing international system and the structures, decision-making mechanisms and political assumptions on which many global institutions were built. As power becomes more distributed, governments increasingly prioritize strategic autonomy and national security over collective commitments. Meanwhile, developing countries question the fairness of institutions in which influence does not always reflect contemporary economic and demographic realities.
This study examines the underlying causes of the erosion of international consensus, evaluates its consequences across security, trade, development and climate governance, and explores practical avenues for renewing multilateral cooperation. It argues that the future of global governance will depend not on eliminating geopolitical competition, but on building institutions capable of managing that competition while preserving minimum standards of international cooperation.
Keywords: Multilateralism, United Nations, Global Governance, Great-Power Competition, International Institutions, International Security, Economic Fragmentation, Climate Diplomacy.
1. Introduction: The Paradox of an Interdependent World
The contemporary international system is defined by a fundamental contradiction: the world’s most serious challenges increasingly require coordinated international action, while the political conditions necessary for such cooperation are becoming more difficult to sustain.
Financial instability can spread across borders within hours. Conflicts in strategically important regions can disrupt energy supplies, shipping routes and global markets. Climate change affects countries regardless of their contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, while infectious diseases and emerging technologies create risks that cannot be contained by national borders alone. Yet governments continue to disagree over who should bear the costs, who should establish the rules and whose interests should take priority.
Multilateral institutions were created to address precisely these problems. The United Nations was designed to facilitate international peace and security, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to support monetary stability and development, the World Trade Organization to establish predictable rules for international commerce, and institutions such as the World Health Organization to coordinate responses to threats affecting human health.
These institutions have not become irrelevant. They continue to provide diplomatic forums, technical expertise, development assistance and mechanisms for negotiation. Nevertheless, their ability to translate international agreements into practical outcomes is increasingly being tested.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 identifies geoeconomic confrontation as the leading immediate global risk, followed by state-based armed conflict. It also warns that intensifying competition and weakening multilateral coordination could make shared challenges more difficult to manage. These findings illustrate the growing tension between geopolitical rivalry and the need for collective solutions. [1]
The central question, therefore, is not simply why international institutions are struggling. It is whether the existing model of global governance can adapt to a world in which power is more widely distributed, strategic distrust is deepening and governments are increasingly unwilling to accept constraints that conflict with their national interests.
The crisis is best understood as a combination of political paralysis, institutional imbalance, unequal economic power and declining confidence in the legitimacy of the international system.
2. The Return of Great-Power Competition
One of the principal obstacles to international consensus is the intensification of strategic competition among major powers.
The post-Cold War period encouraged expectations that economic interdependence, expanding international trade and stronger institutions would gradually reduce the incentives for confrontation. Although cooperation expanded in several areas, it did not eliminate strategic rivalry. The relationship between the United States and China, Russia’s confrontation with Western governments, and disagreements over sanctions, technology and military security demonstrate the continuing importance of power politics.
Governments increasingly view trade, investment, energy, technology and financial infrastructure through the lens of national security. Export controls, sanctions, restrictions on investment and efforts to secure strategic supply chains have consequently become important instruments of foreign policy.
Such measures may serve legitimate national objectives, but their expanding use can undermine the rules and expectations that make international cooperation possible. When governments fear that economic interdependence may be exploited against them, they become more inclined to reduce dependencies, diversify alliances and establish alternative institutions.
The result is a more fragmented international environment in which cooperation increasingly depends on whether it serves the immediate strategic interests of participating states.
This development is particularly challenging for universal institutions. The United Nations, for example, brings together states with radically different political systems, security concerns and interpretations of international law. The WTO must accommodate competing economic models and industrial strategies. Climate negotiations must reconcile the priorities of fossil-fuel producers, industrial economies, emerging powers and countries highly vulnerable to environmental change.
These disagreements are not new. What has changed is the extent to which strategic competition now affects multiple policy areas simultaneously.
The World Economic Forum argues that geopolitical and geoeconomic confrontation reinforce each other: weakening institutions encourage unilateral action, while unilateral action further undermines trust in shared rules. [1]
This feedback loop represents one of the central dangers facing the contemporary international order. Once governments begin to doubt that international rules will be applied consistently, their incentive to comply voluntarily diminishes. Cooperation becomes more transactional, and every negotiation risks turning into a contest over relative advantage.
3. The United Nations and the Limits of Collective Security
The United Nations remains the most universal forum for international diplomacy, but its central security institution—the Security Council—illustrates the structural limitations of the current multilateral system.
The Council was designed in 1945 around the principle that the major powers had to remain involved in decisions concerning international peace and security. Its five permanent members—the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and France—possess veto power, meaning that a negative vote by any one of them can prevent the adoption of a substantive resolution, even when most Council members support it.
This arrangement reflected the political circumstances following the Second World War. Its underlying assumption was that international peace would be difficult to maintain without the participation of the strongest military powers.
However, the same mechanism can paralyse the institution when a major power believes that collective action conflicts with its strategic interests or those of a close partner.
A clear example occurred on 4 June 2025, when the United States vetoed a Security Council draft resolution calling for an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza. The remaining 14 Council members voted in favour. The resolution therefore failed despite overwhelming support among the Council’s members. [2]
The episode illustrated the tension between two competing principles: preserving the participation of major powers and enabling the international community to respond effectively to humanitarian emergencies.
The underlying problem is not limited to one conflict or one permanent member. The veto creates a structural vulnerability whenever the interests of a permanent member—or those of an ally it considers strategically important—conflict with a proposed collective response.
This does not mean that every majority-backed resolution would be effective if adopted. Security Council decisions depend on political cooperation, access to information, enforcement capacity and the willingness of states to implement them. Nevertheless, repeated paralysis can undermine confidence in the institution’s ability to uphold its stated principles.
The Council also faces a legitimacy problem. Its permanent membership reflects the distribution of power in 1945 more closely than the demographic and economic realities of the twenty-first century. Africa and Latin America lack permanent representation, while major emerging economies continue to seek a greater role in global decision-making.
The 2024 Pact for the Future, adopted by UN member states, explicitly recognized the need to reform the Security Council and make it more representative, inclusive, effective and accountable. [3]
The difficulty lies in translating this recognition into institutional change. Reforming the Council requires broad agreement on issues such as the number of additional members, regional representation, veto powers and the procedures governing amendments to the UN Charter.
The paradox is evident: the Council requires reform to become more effective, but the countries with the greatest ability to determine the outcome are also those whose existing privileges may be affected.
4. The Crisis of International Economic Governance
Political deadlock is only one dimension of the problem. International economic institutions are also struggling to preserve predictable rules in an increasingly competitive global economy.
4.1. The World Trade Organization and the weakening of enforcement
The World Trade Organization was established to provide a common framework for international commerce and to help resolve trade disputes through agreed procedures.
However, its dispute-settlement system has suffered a major institutional weakness since December 2019, when the WTO Appellate Body lost the capacity to function because appointments of new members could not be agreed upon.
Without a functioning Appellate Body, parties can appeal certain panel reports without a functioning appellate process to complete the review. This can prevent the reports from becoming final and enforceable through the ordinary WTO mechanism.
The result is a system in which rules remain in place, but the predictability and enforceability of those rules have been weakened. Some WTO members have established interim arrangements, and disputes continue to be addressed through panels, negotiations and other procedures. The system has not disappeared, but its limitations have encouraged concern about the future of rules-based trade. [4]
These weaknesses have become more consequential as governments increasingly employ tariffs, industrial subsidies, export controls and investment restrictions for strategic purposes.
Trade disagreements that once might have been managed primarily through established legal procedures can now become part of wider disputes over national security, technological leadership and geopolitical influence.
The challenge is therefore both legal and political. A stronger dispute-settlement mechanism would help, but it would not eliminate disagreements over the appropriate balance between free trade, economic security and domestic industrial policy.
4.2. Economic fragmentation and the return of protectionism
The broader international economy is also experiencing growing fragmentation.
Governments are seeking to reduce dependence on strategic competitors, establish more secure supply chains and protect industries considered essential to national security. In some circumstances, these policies may increase resilience. However, widespread fragmentation can raise costs, duplicate infrastructure and reduce the benefits of international specialization.
Smaller economies face particular difficulties. Countries with limited bargaining power may struggle to resist pressure from larger trading partners or to secure access to advanced technologies, investment and critical resources.
The danger is that the global economy becomes divided into overlapping networks of preferential relationships rather than operating through broadly shared rules. Such an arrangement would not necessarily produce a complete division into two opposing blocs. Instead, it could create a more complicated system in which cooperation varies across trade, technology, finance and security.
For international institutions, this creates a serious challenge. Their effectiveness depends partly on the assumption that member states consider common rules useful even when those rules occasionally produce inconvenient outcomes.
When governments increasingly regard institutions as arenas for geopolitical competition, the willingness to accept collective constraints becomes weaker.
5. Climate Governance: Agreement Without Sufficient Implementation
Climate change provides another example of the gap between the need for global cooperation and the difficulty of achieving it.
Greenhouse gas emissions accumulate across borders, while the impacts of climate change vary considerably between countries and communities. No country can independently resolve the problem, and national efforts become less effective if major emitters fail to act.
Yet climate diplomacy involves difficult disputes over historical responsibility, development rights, the cost of transitioning away from fossil fuels and the provision of finance to vulnerable countries.
Developed economies have contributed disproportionately to historical emissions, while many developing countries argue that they need additional resources to pursue low-carbon development without sacrificing economic growth or poverty reduction.
These disagreements affect negotiations over emissions targets, adaptation, climate finance and the future of fossil fuels. They also raise a broader question of international fairness: how can states with unequal resources and different historical responsibilities be expected to undertake meaningful collective action?
The climate process has nevertheless demonstrated that multilateral cooperation remains possible.
The COP30 conference in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025 produced a package of 56 decisions adopted by consensus, according to the conference presidency’s executive report released in March 2026. The process maintained a shared negotiating framework despite substantial differences among participating governments. [5]
However, consensus on decisions does not automatically guarantee implementation at the national level. Governments must translate agreements into legislation, investment, emissions reductions and adaptation programmes. The scale and timing of these measures can differ significantly.
The crucial distinction is between diplomatic agreement and measurable outcomes.
Climate negotiations can preserve a common international framework while leaving substantial differences over ambition, resources and the distribution of costs unresolved. If commitments are not backed by adequate finance, credible implementation and transparent monitoring, the credibility of the entire process risks eroding.
The lesson extends beyond climate policy. Multilateral institutions must be evaluated not only by the agreements they produce, but also by whether those agreements improve conditions on the ground.
6. The North–South Divide and the Crisis of Institutional Legitimacy
A further source of tension concerns the distribution of influence within international institutions.
Many developing countries argue that existing governance arrangements do not adequately reflect changes in global economic weight, population, development needs or regional political influence. Their concerns extend beyond representation to the distribution of financial resources, access to technology and the conditions attached to international assistance.
This issue is particularly important in global development finance.
According to UN Trade and Development’s 2026 report on external debt sustainability, developing countries’ external debt reached $12.3 trillion in 2025. Although total debt-service payments declined that year, interest costs on long-term external debt increased by nearly 14%. Least developed countries spent 18.2% of their export earnings servicing external debt. [6]
These pressures reduce the resources available for public services, infrastructure, health, education and climate adaptation.
For countries already facing economic or humanitarian emergencies, international cooperation is therefore not merely a diplomatic question. It is directly connected to their capacity to protect vulnerable populations and sustain long-term development.
When multilateral financial institutions are perceived as insufficiently responsive to these needs, governments have stronger incentives to seek alternative funding sources and regional partnerships.
Such alternatives may provide useful additional resources and diversify economic relationships. Nevertheless, the emergence of competing financial arrangements can also complicate coordination, common standards and debt management.
The issue is not whether developing countries should have more influence. It is how international institutions can adapt their governance structures while maintaining financial stability, accountability and effective decision-making.
A multilateral system that appears to distribute both power and responsibility unfairly will struggle to secure the trust required for sustained cooperation.
Legitimacy is not a substitute for institutional capacity, but it is an essential condition for it.
7. The Limits of Global Health Cooperation
Public health demonstrates both the weaknesses and the continued potential of multilateralism.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed substantial differences in access to vaccines, medical equipment, treatments and public-health resources. It also demonstrated the consequences of fragmented information-sharing and uncoordinated national responses.
In response, WHO member states adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement on 20 May 2025. The agreement was designed to strengthen international cooperation on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, drawing lessons from the inequities and coordination failures experienced during COVID-19. [7]
This achievement is important because it shows that governments can still negotiate common rules in areas where their interests overlap.
Yet adoption of the agreement did not complete every element of the process. Negotiations on the annex concerning pathogen access and benefit-sharing continued through 2026, with further work required before the arrangement could proceed to its next legal and institutional stages. [8]
The remaining issues illustrate why technical cooperation can become politically difficult. Countries that provide pathogen samples and genetic information want fair access to the vaccines, diagnostics and treatments developed from them. Pharmaceutical and research systems must also operate within frameworks that protect legitimate interests while supporting public-health objectives.
Developing countries, in particular, have strong reasons to seek assurances that cooperation will produce equitable benefits rather than reproduce existing inequalities.
These negotiations demonstrate that the crisis of consensus is not absolute. Agreements remain achievable, especially when governments recognize that they share a concrete risk. However, the details of implementation and the distribution of costs and benefits can prove as difficult as reaching the initial political agreement.
The effectiveness of multilateral health governance will depend on whether states can turn formal commitments into practical arrangements that are credible, adequately financed and equitable.
8. Why Consensus Has Become So Difficult
The cases examined above reveal several interconnected causes of institutional weakness.
8.1. Outdated institutional structures
Many international institutions emerged from the political and economic settlements of the twentieth century. Although their mandates have evolved, some decision-making structures still reflect the priorities and power distribution of an earlier era.
When representation does not adequately reflect contemporary realities, demands for reform intensify. Yet reform itself can threaten established privileges, making institutional adaptation difficult.
8.2. The tension between sovereignty and collective responsibility
International institutions depend on states that retain sovereign authority. They can establish rules, coordinate action and exert diplomatic pressure, but their ability to compel compliance varies considerably.
Governments may endorse international cooperation in principle while resisting decisions that impose significant domestic costs or limit their freedom of action.
This tension becomes particularly acute during security crises, when leaders tend to prioritize national interests and immediate strategic concerns over longer-term collective objectives.
8.3. Unequal distribution of costs and benefits
International agreements frequently create unequal short-term costs and long-term benefits.
Climate measures may require substantial investment today while delivering benefits over decades. Public-health cooperation may require the sharing of information and resources before the precise benefits become apparent. Trade agreements may generate overall economic gains while imposing concentrated costs on particular industries or communities.
When states believe they are being asked to accept disproportionate burdens, they become less willing to compromise.
Effective multilateralism must therefore address not only the technical design of agreements but also questions of fairness, financing and compensation.
8.4. Domestic political pressures
International cooperation is ultimately implemented through national political systems. Governments face electoral competition, public dissatisfaction, economic pressures and disagreements within their own societies.
These domestic considerations can limit the willingness of leaders to make concessions internationally, particularly when opponents portray compromise as a loss of sovereignty or a surrender of national interests.
The relationship between domestic politics and multilateral diplomacy has therefore become increasingly important. Even technically sound international agreements can fail when governments lack the political support necessary to implement them.
8.5. Weak enforcement and accountability
International institutions often struggle to ensure compliance when powerful states oppose their decisions.
Legal mechanisms, monitoring arrangements, economic incentives and diplomatic pressure can encourage states to honour their commitments, but none provides a universal solution.
When violations produce few consequences, the credibility of rules declines. Other governments may then conclude that compliance is optional or that unilateral action offers greater advantages than cooperation.
This creates a self-reinforcing cycle in which declining confidence weakens the institutions designed to sustain international order.
9. Is Multilateralism Being Replaced or Reconfigured?
The difficulties facing universal institutions have encouraged greater reliance on regional organizations, ad hoc diplomatic coalitions and smaller groups of countries willing to cooperate on particular issues.
These arrangements can provide flexibility. A limited group of states may be able to agree on practical measures more quickly than a universal organization whose members hold widely differing positions.
Regional organizations can also draw on local knowledge and political relationships that may be less accessible to global institutions.
However, these alternatives have limitations.
Smaller coalitions may exclude countries affected by their decisions, lack universal legitimacy or create competing standards. They may also struggle to provide sufficient resources for problems requiring global participation.
A country excluded from one coalition may question the fairness of its decisions, while competing groups can introduce additional layers of political and economic fragmentation.
The most plausible future is therefore not necessarily a complete replacement of multilateralism, but a more complex system combining universal institutions, regional cooperation and issue-specific coalitions.
The central challenge is to ensure that flexible arrangements reinforce rather than undermine common international rules.
Smaller coalitions should ideally serve as mechanisms for advancing practical solutions when universal agreement is difficult, while keeping their outcomes compatible with broader international frameworks.
The distinction matters: a coalition that helps implement widely supported rules can strengthen global governance, while one that seeks to bypass shared obligations may deepen the crisis of legitimacy.
10. Reforming Multilateral Institutions: From Diplomatic Declarations to Practical Results
Restoring confidence in international institutions requires more than reaffirming the importance of cooperation. It requires reforms that address the political and structural factors preventing institutions from delivering results.
First, Security Council reform must become more practical. Greater representation for underrepresented regions, more transparent procedures and stronger accountability would help address legitimacy concerns. Proposals to limit the use of the veto in situations involving mass atrocities also deserve serious consideration. However, meaningful reform will require difficult negotiations among the existing permanent members and the wider UN membership.
Second, international institutions must strengthen implementation and accountability. Agreements should include measurable objectives, realistic timelines, transparent monitoring and regular assessments of compliance. Where enforcement is limited, institutions should make better use of incentives, diplomatic engagement and agreed mechanisms for resolving disagreements.
Third, international economic governance must become more predictable. Restoring a credible WTO dispute-settlement system would reduce uncertainty and help governments manage trade disputes through agreed procedures. Broader reforms should also address the relationship between trade rules, legitimate national-security concerns and industrial policy.
Fourth, development finance and debt restructuring require more effective cooperation. Highly indebted countries need credible mechanisms for addressing unsustainable debt burdens while maintaining investment in essential public services and long-term development. Multilateral lenders, creditor governments and private creditors should coordinate more effectively to reduce uncertainty and avoid prolonged negotiations.
Fifth, climate agreements must be matched by adequate finance and implementation. Governments need clearer mechanisms for assessing progress, supporting vulnerable countries and translating common commitments into national action. Cooperation will remain fragile if developing countries believe that responsibilities are being imposed without adequate resources.
Sixth, institutions should make greater use of flexible coalitions without abandoning universal principles. When consensus is unattainable, willing governments can make progress on specific issues, provided that their initiatives remain transparent, inclusive where possible and consistent with broader international obligations.
Finally, international institutions must communicate more effectively with the public. Their legitimacy depends partly on whether citizens can understand how international cooperation affects their security, livelihoods and prospects for development. Greater transparency, accessible reporting and stronger engagement with civil society can help counter the perception that multilateral diplomacy serves only political and economic elites.
Reform should not be understood as an effort to remove all disagreement from international affairs. It should be regarded as an attempt to make institutions more capable of managing disagreement without allowing it to produce paralysis.
11. The Future of Global Governance: Between Fragmentation and Pragmatic Cooperation
The coming years are likely to test the capacity of multilateral institutions to adapt to a more competitive and fragmented international environment.
Several pressures will remain particularly important: strategic rivalry among major powers, conflicts with cross-border consequences, competition over critical technologies, climate-related risks, financial vulnerability and disagreements over the distribution of international responsibilities.
These pressures could deepen fragmentation if governments increasingly prioritize unilateral action and narrow geopolitical alignments.
Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that multilateralism has exhausted its usefulness.
International institutions continue to provide platforms for diplomacy, establish technical standards, coordinate development programmes and create common frameworks for addressing shared problems. Even governments in competition with one another have strong reasons to preserve cooperation in areas where the costs of fragmentation would be substantial.
The challenge is to identify practical areas in which shared interests can outweigh political differences.
Public health, disaster response, maritime safety, debt transparency, technical standards and certain forms of environmental cooperation may offer opportunities for incremental progress. Success in such areas cannot eliminate major geopolitical conflicts, but it can preserve channels of communication and demonstrate the value of collective action.
A renewed multilateral system will also need to recognize that countries do not enter negotiations with equal resources or bargaining power. Cooperation is more likely to endure when institutions provide credible opportunities for participation, acknowledge legitimate development concerns and distribute responsibilities in ways that members consider defensible.
Ultimately, the test of international institutions is not whether they can produce declarations calling for cooperation. It is whether they can help governments manage conflicts, reduce risks and deliver improvements that would be difficult or impossible to achieve independently.
12. Conclusion: Rebuilding Consensus in a Competitive World
The struggle of multilateral institutions to manage global crises reflects a deeper transformation of the international order.
Institutions built to facilitate cooperation among sovereign states are confronting a world in which strategic competition affects security, trade, finance, technology and climate policy simultaneously. Their difficulties are compounded by unequal representation, disagreements over the distribution of costs, domestic political pressures and limited enforcement mechanisms.
The result is not the disappearance of international cooperation, but a widening gap between the scale of global challenges and the capacity of existing governance structures to address them.
The United Nations, WTO, WHO and international climate framework continue to perform important functions. Their limitations, however, demonstrate that institutional survival is not the same as institutional effectiveness.
Reform will require more representative decision-making, stronger implementation, fairer financing arrangements and practical mechanisms for resolving disputes. It will also require a recognition that global cooperation cannot depend on the assumption that major powers will always share the same political objectives.
A more realistic approach would seek to manage rivalry through rules, preserve cooperation where interests overlap and prevent disagreements in one area from destroying collaboration in others.
The international community does not need complete consensus on every geopolitical question to make progress. It needs sufficient agreement on the rules, responsibilities and practical arrangements required to prevent competition from becoming a permanent obstacle to collective action.
The future of multilateralism will ultimately depend on whether governments conclude that the benefits of maintaining a functioning international system outweigh the short-term advantages of acting alone.
In a world of shared risks and competing ambitions, consensus may become harder to achieve. But without credible institutions capable of converting limited agreement into practical action, the cost of disagreement will increasingly be borne by those least able to absorb it.
The choice is not between a world without conflict and a world with conflict. It is between a world that has institutions capable of managing conflict and one in which strategic rivalry increasingly determines the fate of global crises.
References and Further Reading
- World Economic Forum. (2026). Global Risks Report 2026: Global Risks in-Depth — Multipolarity Without Multilateralism.
https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2026/in-full/global-risks-report-2026-chapter-2/ - United Nations. (2025). Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Calling for Permanent Ceasefire in Gaza, Owing to Veto by United States.
https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16708.doc.htm - United Nations. (2024). Pact for the Future — Transforming Global Governance.
https://www.un.org/pact-for-the-future/en/chapter-v-transforming-global-governance - World Trade Organization. (2026). WTO Reform — Post-MC14 Briefing Note.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc14_e/briefing_notes_e/wtoreform_e.htm - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2026). COP30 Presidency Releases Executive Report and Outlines Next Steps to Accelerate Global Climate Implementation.
https://unfccc.int/news/cop30-presidency-releases-executive-report-and-outlines-next-steps-to-accelerate-global-climate - UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2026). External Debt Sustainability and Development 2026.
https://unctad.org/publication/external-debt-sustainability-and-development-2026 - World Health Organization. (2025). World Health Assembly Adopts Historic Pandemic Agreement to Make the World More Equitable and Safer from Future Pandemics.
https://www.who.int/news/item/20-05-2025-world-health-assembly-adopts-historic-pandemic-agreement-to-make-the-world-more-equitable-and-safer-from-future-pandemics - World Health Organization. (2026). Intergovernmental Working Group on the WHO Pandemic Agreement.
https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly/intergovernmental-working-group-on-the-who-pandemic-agreement - United Nations. (2024). Pact for the Future.
https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future - International Monetary Fund. (2026). World Economic Outlook, April 2026: Global Economy in the Shadow of War.
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2026/04/14/world-economic-outlook-april-2026
